AW: Warum wurde Berlin 1945 geteilt ?
Quellen und Originaltexte fuer die oben geposteten Uebersetzungen:
(1) Stalin now asked, "Are there any other questions?" The
President replied, "There is the question of Germany." Stalin
said that he would like to see Germany split up. The Presi-
dent agreed, (Churchill ; Closing The Ring ppg 400; 401; Teheran Conference 1943)
(2)Roosevelt said that, so that there could be some discussion, he and his advisers had
had a shot at a plan some three months before. This involved the dividing of Germany into five parts. (Churchill ; Closing The Ring ppg 400; 401; Teheran Conference 1943)
(3)Roosevelt then explained his plan for splitting Germany into five parts: (1) Prussia, (2) Hanover and the northwest part of Germany. (3) Saxony and the Leipzig area. (4) Hesse-
Darmstadt, Hesse-Cassel, and the section south of the Rhine. (5) Bavaria, Baden, and Wiirttemberg. These five sections would be' self-governing, but there were two more that would be governed by the United Nations: (1) Kiel and its canal and Hamburg. (2) The Ruhr and the Saar. These would be under the control of the United Nations as trustees. He was only throwing this out as an idea which might be talked over.
(4)Both President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin at Teheran wished to cut Ger-
many into smaller pieces than I had in mind.
(5) Stalin now asked how Germany was to be dismembered. Were we to have one Government or several, or merely some form of administration? If Hitler surrendered unconditionally should we preserve his Government or refuse to treat with it?
At Teheran Mr. Roosevelt had suggested dividing Germany into five parts, and he had agreed with him. [...]
I said that we all agreed that Germany should be dismembered, but the actual method was much too complicated to be settled in five or six days. It would require a very searching examination of the historical, ethnographical, and economic facts, ~nd prolonged examination by a special committee, which would go into -the different proposals and advise on them. There was so much to consider. What to do with Prussia?
(Churchill ; triumph and tragedy; Yalta ;ppg 351 ;352;353 )
(6)Plans for the partition of Germany were now in the course of preparation but no final decisions had been taken.
(United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States. Conference at Quebec, 1944 )
(7)
J. FINAL DOCUMENTS OF THE CONFERENCE
(1) TREATMENT OF GERMANY
Roosevelt Papers ;Memorandum Initialed by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill 1
At a conference between the President and the Prime Minister upon the best measures to prevent renewed rearmament by Germany, it was felt that an essential feature was the future disposition of the Ruhr and the Saar.
The ease with which the metallurgical, chemical and electric industries in Germany can be converted from peace to war has already been impressed upon us by bitter experience.
[///](United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States)
(8)In particular we have weighed the treatment to be accorded Germany in order to
weaken its capacity to make another war and to curb the war-like character of the German people.
We have explored the possible advantages and disadvantages to durable security of partitioning the German state, in comparison with the gains or risks of leaving Ger-
many unified. And we have considered the possibility of segregating the industrial regions of the Rhineland, the Ruhr, the Saar and Silesia,or of placing these areas under some form of international control in order to prevent the rebuilding of Germany's military might.
(Position paper ;II. THE FIRST- QUEBEC CONFERENCE; Roosevelt Papers; Air. Myron C. Taylor to President Roosevelt' ; NEW YORK, [August 10, 1943.])
(9)
London, 22 October 1944.top secret
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Prime Minister to President Roosevelt Personal and Top Secret Number 801.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Para 6. We2Churchill and Stalin in Moscow. also discussed informally the future partition of Germany. U. J. wants Poland Czecho and Hungary to form a realm of independent anti-Nazi pro-Russian states, the first two of which might join together. Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of south-German states, including Austria, Bavaria, Württemberg, and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation has always been attractive to me, though I should prefer to add Hungary, to which U. J. is strongly opposed.
Para 7. As to Prussia, U. J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar detached and put out of action and probably under international control and a separate state formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internationalization of the Kiel canal. I am not opposed to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple meeting.3In reply (No. 632, dated October 22, 1944) Roosevelt commented: “Your statement of the present attitude of U. J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and Montreux convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters together with our Pacific war effort at the forthcoming three party meeting.” (secret private correspondence ;Roosevelt Papers.)
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1 Sent by the United States Military Attaché, London, via Army channels. For other excerpts from this telegram, see ante, p. 10, and post, pp. 206, 328, 400.
2 Churchill and Stalin in Moscow.
3 In reply (No. 632, dated October 22, 1944) Roosevelt commented: “Your statement of the present attitude of U. J. towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and Montreux convention is most interesting. We should discuss these matters together with our Pacific war effort at the forthcoming three party meeting.” (Roosevelt Papers.)
(.Correspondence Roosevelt - Churchill state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Malta/d123#fn3)
(10)
I have strong feeling that our present approach to problem of preventing Germany from "again becoming threat to peace of theworld" is unrealistic. We are undertaking controls now which we aretold would have prevented World War II had they been undertakenafter World War I. Thus we have attempted to improve on Versaillesby absolutely forbidding Germany to arm, with intention of prevent-ing another Von Seeckt2 conspiracy; we have limited Germany's in-dustrial production and capacity and prohibited certain industries,have placed Ruhr to some extent under international control, and havemade deconcentration an agreed occupation policy, all with view topreventing re-emergence in Germany of a predominant industrialpotential under highly centralized control.
These restrictions seemed logical in a context of post-war inter-national cooperation, when world-wide control of atomic energy andworld-wide disarmament appeared to be possible. I question whetherthey make sense in present divided world,
(The United States High Comnmissioner for Germany (McCloy) to the
Secretary of State
SECRET NO DISTRIBUTION FRANEFORT, April 25, 1950-4 p.m.)
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(11) Received on November 22, 1941
W. CHURCHILL TO J. V. STALIN*
[...]I notice that you wish also to discuss the post-war organisationof peace. Our intention is to fight the war, in alliance withyou and in constant consultation with you, to the utmost of ourstrength and however long it lasts, and when the war is won, asI am sure it will be, we expect that Soviet Russia, Great Britain
and the U.S.A. will meet at the council table of victory as thethree principal partners and as the agencies by which Nazism
will have been destroyed. Naturally the first object will be toprevent Germany, and particularly Prussia, from breaking outupon us for a third time.[...]
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Sent on November 23, 1941
MESSAGE FROM PREMIER STALIN
TO PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
It is quite true thatthe discussion and adoption of a plan for the post-war organisationof peace .should be designed to keep Germany, above allPrussia, from again breaking the peace and plunging the nationsInto -a new bloodbath.
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